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THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS
OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
William H.J. Hubbard1

Ever since Twombly and Iqbal introduced the doctrine of plausibility pleading, a cottage industry of legal scholars (including myself) has undertaken to
detect the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on litigants and case outcomes. Results so far have been equivocal, and it has been hard to make sense of the
disparate methodologies and findings. In this paper, I develop a comprehensive yet non-technical framework for empirically testing the effect of
Twombly and Iqbal on lower courts and litigants, taking into account a wide
range of confounding factors and the numerous ways in which Twombly and
Iqbal may have indirectly affected litigant behavior. Using this framework, I
test for effects of Twombly and Iqbal on district court and litigant behavior
using two datasets—one of administrative data covering hundreds of thousands of cases, and one of detailed, hand- and machine-coded docket and
complaint data covering a representative sample of nearly 2,000 cases. I also
review existing findings. Based on preliminary analyses, which are subject to
revision as additional data is compiled, I find only limited evidence that
Twombly and Iqbal, the two most important pleading cases in 50 years, have
had a major effect on the behavior of lawyers and judges across all cases.
Rates of dismissal with prejudice have held steady, motions to dismiss remain uncommon, and settlement and filing patterns have not changed appreciably in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. There is, however, evidence of effects on pro se plaintiffs. Further, while case outcomes have been largely unaffected by Twombly and Iqbal, there is evidence that lawyers changed their
pleading and motion practice in predictable ways in the wake of those cases.
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INTRODUCTION

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff’s complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”
As affirmed in the seminal case Conley v. Gibson, this “notice pleading” standard required only that the pleading give the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s grievance.1 A line from Conley became the mantra
for this approach: “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”2
When Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly3 “retired” this language from
Conley, the result was “shockwaves through the legal community—for
academics, practitioners, and judges alike.”4 Twombly was on its way
to becoming one of the most cited case of all time, “notice pleading”
was now “plausibility pleading,” and the academic reaction to
Twombly reflected a sense that a revolution in pleading and court
practice was underway.5
Two years later, Ashcroft v. Iqbal elaborated on Twombly and reiterated the rule that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.”6 With Iqbal, the controversy over
pleading standards intensified. Law review articles and congressional
testimony predicted “devastating” consequences to civil litigants, especially employment discrimination plaintiffs, who often lack direct evidence of the defendant’s motives at the outset of litigation and thus
may be unable to plead sufficient factual detail to reach discovery.7
This raises the question: After Twombly and Iqbal, how much
changed? We have the benefit of a large body of empirical work inspired by Twombly and Iqbal (herein occasionally, “Twiqbal”). What
have we learned?
Surprisingly, given the strong academic reaction in the immediate
wake of those cases, the empirical evidence to date has been inconclusive. Indeed, every study of the rates at which motion to dismiss8 are
355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
355 U.S. at 45–46.
3 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4 Steinman (2010) at 1305.
5 Hoffman (2008, p. 1235); Steinman (2010, p. 1310); Miller (2010, p. 28).
6 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
7 Reinert (2011, p. 123); see also Spencer (2008); Cooper (2011, p. 960); Davis
(2009); Rubin (2009). See also Schnapper (2009): “Twombly and Iqbal have
brought about sweeping changes in the lower courts, all for the worse.”
8 Throughout this paper, “motions to dismiss” and “dismissal” refer to motions to dismiss and dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Nothing in this paper speaks to motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, or for failure to join an indispensable party, for example.
1
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granted with prejudice9 has found no statistically significant change in
grant rates after either Twombly or Iqbal, even for employment discrimination cases.10
Not all of the evidence indicates no effect, however. The best (and
virtually only) evidence of a major effect of Twiqbal is Gelbach (2012),
who, using data from Cecil et al. (2011a), finds the effect in the form of
higher rates at which defendants file motions to dismiss, though
courts grant the motions at the same rate before and after Twiqbal.
Even here, though, the estimated lower bound of the effect (because of
the methodology, it was not possible for Gelbach to estimate an upper
bound) is about 1 percent of all cases, even for employment discrimination cases.11 The reason for this surprisingly small lower bound is
that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted are rare, even after Iqbal. In 2010, motions to dismiss
were filed in only 6 percent of cases, a rate that has not changed much
over the past three decades.12
In short, the literature to date provides little evidence of a seismic
shift in pleading practice or a differential impact on employment discrimination cases after Twiqbal. But the evidence does not close the
door to the possibility of a large effect, either. The literature has been
plagued by serious methodological limitations, including small sample
sizes, non-representative samples, failure to account for selection effects, and use of coarse data or proxies for the true outcomes of interest. Thus, no single study has been able to prove or disprove a substantial impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the behavior of courts and, in
turn, on the fortunes of plaintiffs and defendants.
Now is the time to take stock of the effect of Twiqbal in a more
comprehensive way. Earlier studies have each contributed important
pieces of the larger puzzle, but large gaps remain. In this paper, I aim
to fill the major gaps in the literature and begin to patch together a
mosaic of results that allow us to see, in a more holistic way, the extent to which Twombly and Iqbal have changed civil litigation—not
just the granting and denial of motions to dismiss, but settlement patterns, the content of pleadings, and the willingness of plaintiffs to file
suit in the first place. While the mosaic of empirical results on this
question will never be complete—there is always more work to be

Unless specifically noted, “dismissal” refers to dismissal with prejudice, including both (1) judicial orders foreclosing the possibility of amendment and
(2) dismissals with leave to amend, when the plaintiff is unable to replead in
a way that meets the pleading standard announced by the court.
10 See Part II. And as I discuss below, in my own earlier study of Twombly (I
did not have data on Iqbal at the time), I was able to reach a fairly precise
estimate of zero for the effect of Twombly on dismissals.
11 See Part II.
12 See Cecil et al. (2011a,b) (reporting data for 2010) and Willging (1989)
(finding motion to dismiss filings in 6 to 12 percent of cases in 1988).
9
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done—my goal in this paper is to organize enough fragments that the
big picture becomes intelligible.
At this point, I must make clear exactly what this paper seeks to
measure. What does it mean to say that Twombly or Iqbal had “an effect”? Given that Twombly and Iqbal define the standard by which a
motion to dismiss is granted or denied, their only direct effect on behavior will be on the propensity of district judges to grant motions to
dismiss. Any other changes that emanate from these decisions will be
the indirect consequence of this direct effect. For example, deterrence
of plaintiffs from filing suits in federal court would stem from the fact
that a greater likelihood of dismissal may reduce a plaintiff’s chances
of reaching discovery—and therefore her chances of a favorable settlement or trial verdict. Thus, holding all else equal, if Twombly and
Iqbal have had any effect at all, they must have changed the tendency
of district court judges to grant motions to dismiss. Of course, all else
may not be equal. If plaintiffs’ lawyers, recognizing an increased
chance of dismissal, respond to Twiqbal by filing fewer cases or drafting longer and more detailed complaints, then Twiqbal will have had
effects, even if we see no rise in dismissals. As Dodson (2015) notes,
strategic responses by actors in the “litigation marketplace” attenuate
direct measures of judicial willingness to dismiss in the wake of Twiqbal.
This points us toward two ways of detecting the effect of Twiqbal.
One way, which I will call the “causal identification” method, is based
on the idea that if we can hold all else equal, we can simply look to
dismissal rates to detect an effect. If dismissals rise after Twombly or
Iqbal, then we have found the hypothesized effect. The other way,
which I will call the “process of elimination” method, is based on the
idea that if we cannot hold all else equal, and we do not find changes
in dismissal rates, then we can look for changes elsewhere that reflect
likely strategic responses of lawyers and parties to the (unobserved)
direct effect of Twiqbal. In this paper, I use both of these methods to
measure the effects of Twiqbal.
The first contribution of this paper, therefore, is methodological. I
show how the entire existing literature can be understood as contributing to one of these two methodological strands: the causalidentification approach and the process-of-elimination approach. Each
strand has different potential threats to the validity of the estimates,
and each strand measures different potential effects of Twiqbal. By
providing a unifying framework for interpreting their results, this paper demonstrates the distinct contribution of each prior study in this
field, as well as the key gaps that need to be filled before increasingly
confident judgments about the effects of Twiqbal can be made.
This paper then fills those gaps. The second contribution of the paper is to bring two new datasets to bear on unresolved questions about
the effects of Twiqbal. First, I have compiled administrative data on
over 400,000 civil cases filed in federal court from 2003 through 2010.
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This dataset, which I call the “AO Data,” is constructed from data files
on terminated and pending cases published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). Its primary limitation is that it
provides only a limited set of information on each case; its strength is
that it contains every civil case to pass through the federal courts, regardless of whether it resulted in a court opinion (whether published
or not), or whether it was dismissed, settled, or taken to judgment.
Second, I have collected a representative sample of docket records
and complaints in federal civil cases filed from 2005 through 2010, and
employed automated text analysis and old-fashioned hand coding to
create a detailed dataset of federal court complaints filed during this
period, and the fates they met. This data is drawn directly from the
U.S. Courts’ electronic case filing and docketing system, through its
public access interface, PACER. This dataset, which I call the “PACER
Data,” contains information on over 1800 docket sheets and complaints in federal employment discrimination lawsuits filed between
2005 and 2010.
Using both the AO Data and PACER Data, and employing both the
causal-identification and process-of-elimination methods, I look for
evidence of Twiqbal’s effect and integrate these findings with the existing literature. What I find is a fairly detailed and coherent picture
of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. Twombly and Iqbal have led to a
greater frequency in filings of motions to dismiss and the amendment
of complaints. But there is little evidence that Twombly or Iqbal precipitated a major change in dismissals with prejudice, settlement patterns, or filing rates.
In Part II, I review the existing literature. In Part III, I describe
the AO Data and the PACER Data. In Part IV, I specify my two methodological approaches and present new empirical results under both
methodologies. In Part V, I take stock of the mosaic of existing and
new results presented in this paper, filling out the picture of the effects of Twiqbal.
Before I proceed, however, I must emphasize a crucial understanding about the claims that I make in this paper. It is safe to reject, a
priori, the claim that Twiqbal has affected no cases. Given that the
federal courts see approximately a quarter-million new case filings
each year (and there are potentially millions of disputes that could be
filed in federal court, but aren’t), there must surely be some disputes—
hundreds? thousands?—whose outcome has turned on the presence or
absence of plausibility pleading under Twiqbal.
Likewise, it should be clear from my definition of “effect” that not
all cases have been affected by Twiqbal. There are certainly some cases that have complaints such that they would never be dismissed either before or after Twiqbal, and there are some cases that, for whatever reason, have complaints such that they would be dismissed even
before Twiqbal, let alone after.

6
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Any discussion, therefore, of Twiqbal’s “effect” must begin with the
shared understanding that Twiqbal has had an effect. The only question is whether the effect is relatively large or relatively small.
I also offer three notes of clarification as to scope. First, my focus is
entirely on quantitative evidence of the impact of Twombly and Iqbal.
I make no claims in this paper about qualitative evidence; for a discussion of qualitative evidence on the effect of Twiqbal, see Hubbard
(2016).
Second, I do not address the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on legal
doctrine, a topic that has been explored by a literature too vast to
summarize here. I merely note that the effects of Twiqbal on legal doctrine and on legal practice may be different.
Third, the goal of this paper is to determine whether Twombly and
Iqbal had a substantial effect on legal practice. There is much to be
said about why we see the patterns that we see in the data, but I address such questions only briefly in this paper. In Hubbard (2016), I
develop a more comprehensive account of why Twombly and Iqbal
would generate such effects.
II.

FINDINGS SO FAR

Over the past half-decade, a large number of studies have attempted
to quantify the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on federal civil litigation.
I will discuss them briefly here, returning to them as I build them into
the analytical framework in Part IV. For a more thoroughgoing survey, see Engstrom (2013).
Every published study of the effect of Twombly on dismissal rates
has found no statistically significant effect. Hannon (2008), Hatamyar
(2010), Hatamyar Moore (2012), Seiner (2009 and 2010), and Brescia
(2012) all used data from published court opinions (i.e., opinions
available on Westlaw, etc.) before and after Twombly, and none finds a
statistically significant change in the share of cases granting motions
to dismiss (with prejudice).13 This is true regardless of whether the
study looks across case types or focuses on civil rights or employment
discrimination cases.
Studies on Iqbal, or the combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal,
largely reach the same conclusion. Cecil et al. (2011a,b), Hatamyar
Moore (2012), and Brescia (2012) found a rise in dismissals without
prejudice after Iqbal, but no change in dismissals with prejudice. The
distinction between dismissals with and without prejudice matters,
because a study focused on the ultimate effect of dismissals without
prejudice concluded that, after accounting for amended complaints
As I note in Hubbard (2013), Hannon (2008) reports a single significant
result in one of his regressions, but this is due to a specification error. A corrected regression on the same data (not reported, on file with author) yields
no significant effect.
13
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and subsequent motions to dismiss, there was zero change in the
share of cases dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) from the pre-Twombly to
the post-Iqbal period (Cecil et al. 2011b).14 Thus, the fact that several
studies found increases in dismissals with leave to amend, but no
change in dismissals with prejudice, suggests little effect on the share
of cases effectively terminated by a ruling on a motion to dismiss.
Isaacharoff and Miller (2013, 454) identified 236 federal appellate
court decisions from 2011 reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Of these, 199 did not involve the factual
sufficiency of the complaint (i.e., the specific pleading standard affected by Twiqbal). Thus, the upper bound on cases potentially affected by
Twombly and Iqbal is 37 out of 236, or less than 16 percent. If this mix
of dismissals at the appellate level corresponds to the mix at the district level (and of course it may not), and given that even after Iqbal
only about 2 percent of cases are dismissed for failure to state a claim,
this suggests an upper bound of the potential reach of Twombly and
Iqbal at less than one-half of 1 percent of cases.
Dodson (2012) found a small but statistically significant increase
in grants of motions to dismiss after Iqbal, although the analysis
pooled together dismissals with and without leave to amend. Dodson
examined rulings on motions to dismiss on a claim-by-claim basis,
comparing pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods. It is not clear from
this analysis, however, whether there has been any meaningful
change in the termination (rather than simply repleading) of claims,
let alone entire cases; as noted above, Cecil et al. (2011b) find that a
spike in dismissals without prejudice after Iqbal was not associated
with higher rates of ultimate dismissals with prejudice. Interestingly,
the statistically significant effect in Dodson (2012) is entirely concentrated among prisoner litigation claims brought by in forma pauperis
prisoners; there is no significant change in the rate at which district
courts dismiss claims in cases with represented plaintiffs.15
Clermont and Eisenberg (2014) reported large apparent effects of
Twombly and Iqbal that are concentrated among pro se cases. Their
results are hard to compare to other results discussed here; their preferred measure is the ratio of pretrial judgments (including both dismissals and summary judgments) in favor of the defendant to pretrial
judgments in favor of the plaintiff. For a related measure, the cumulative likelihood of a pretrial judgment in favor of the defendant over the
duration of a case, they report a statistically significant increase for
cases filed after Iqbal relative to cases files before Twombly. These
Excluding the “financial instruments” category of cases, which was affected
by the home mortgage crisis that intervened between 2006 and 2010, the
share of cases that ultimately were dismissed in the wake of a motion to dismiss fell from 56.8 percent to 56.2 percent, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero change. See Cecil et al. (2011b) at 7, table A-1 (calculations by author).
15 This conclusion is based on analysis of Dodson (2012, 132 table 2).
14
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changes could be due to Twiqbal, changes in summary judgment practice, or time trends induced by the Great Recession or other factors.
While their analysis cannot disentangle these potential causes, Eisenberg and Clermont argue that Twiqbal must be part of the explanation.
Curry and Ward (2013) looked for differential patterns across factpleading and notice-pleading states in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal.
They searched for changes in patterns of removal from state to federal
court, based on the theory that defendants in notice-pleading states
will now have a greater preference for pleading standards in federal
court. But they found no evidence that patterns of removal to federal
court responded to Twombly and Iqbal, and no difference in response
between notice pleading and fact pleading states.
The largest reported change in dismissal rates appears in Quintanilla (2013), who focuses on Title VII race discrimination claims by
black plaintiffs. Quintanilla (2013; pp. 204–205) constructed a dataset
of published court opinions in which Twiqbal is most likely to have an
effect: cases not “on technical grounds,” such as statutory prerequisites to suit under Title VII, but cases which are “ambiguous” in that
the sole issue is the sufficiency of the factual pleadings. The change in
the rate of MTD grants was 30 percent, which was highly statistically
significant, despite a relatively small sample (289 opinions). The analysis did not distinguish between dismissals with and without prejudice, however.
To date, the most comprehensive study of decisions on motions to
dismiss is Reinert (2015). Reinert hand-coded approximately 4,200
district court rulings on motions to dismiss from 2006 and 2010, using
the federal court’s PACER system to sample from all rulings on motions to dismiss, regardless of whether the court’s opinion was published or not. Other than Cecil et al. (2011a,b), this is the only prior
study to use this methodology to generate a sample of rulings on motions to dismiss. Reinert found statistically significant increases in
dismissal rates in 2010 relative to 2006. Like other studies, however,
this result was driven by increases in dismissals with leave to amend;
there were no statistically significant increases in dismissals with
prejudice overall, or within any case category.
All of these straightforward comparisons of observed dismissal
rates, however, must be approached with caution, as they do not account for the possibility that Twombly or Iqbal had a major effect, but
the mix of cases before and after these cases changed in ways that obscured the true effect on dismissal rates. For example, if the plausibility standard announced in Twombly led many plaintiffs not to file suit
at all, it is possible that the share of filed cases being dismissed may
not change, even though many (potential) plaintiffs are nonetheless
losing their day in court. I will discuss these effects, usually called “selection effects,” more thoroughly in Part IV below.
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Some recent work has attempted to address the possibility of
changes in the composition of filed cases after Twombly and Iqbal. In
my earlier study of the effect of Twombly (Hubbard 2013), I developed
an empirical methodology to address selection effects, which Engstrom
(2013) calls the “straddle” approach. The essence of this approach is to
compare the outcomes of (1) cases that were filed before Twombly and
which could have been dismissed before Twombly and (2) cases that
were filed before Twombly, but which did not have an opportunity to
be dismissed until after Twombly. By limiting my analysis to cases
filed before Twombly, I controlled for potential changes in the composition of cases filed after Twombly. See Figure 1 for an illustration of
the methodology. Applying this approach to a large dataset, I could
reject the hypothesis that Twombly affected more than .4 percent of all
cases.
Gelbach (2012) systematically addressed selection effects and focuses on the outcomes of cases in the wake of Iqbal. He used a formal
model to account for selection effects on the composition of cases with
litigated motions to dismiss.16 He generated a lower bound on the
number of cases “affected” by Twombly and Iqbal that represents 21.5
percent of all cases in which a motion to dismiss was filed.17 To make
this number comparable with my results described above, one must
take into account that in the data used by Gelbach, 5.0 percent of all
cases involved a motion to dismiss, which means that the lower bound
for “affected cases” is about 1 percent of all cases.18 His results were
very similar for employment discrimination cases.19 This lower bound
on “affected cases,” however, includes the “effect” of repleading after a
dismissal with leave to amend, as Engstrom (2013) points out. Using
Gelbach’s (2012) methodology, but counting only dismissal with prejudice of a plaintiff’s case, Engstrom (2013) finds a lower bound of 11.3

Given limitations in the data, Gelbach could not account for possible time
trends in the composition of filed cases from 2006 and 2010. See Gelbach
(2015) for a discussion of other potential limitations to his study and his responses to them.
17 This number is statistically different from zero (Gelbach 2012, 2331).
18 According to the FJC data Gelbach (2012) cites, motions to dismiss were
filed in 5 percent of cases in the post-Iqbal sample period, and he estimated a
lower bound of 21.5 percent of these filings were “affected” by Twombly and
Iqbal. 21.5 percent of 5 percent is about 1.1 percent.
19 Gelbach is careful to point out that the “negatively affected share” was lower for employment discrimination cases (15.4 percent rather than 21.5 percent), a surprising result given the literature (Gelbach 2012, 2331–32). Because more employment discrimination cases involve motions to dismiss (9.0
percent, id. at 2326), however, dismissals as a share of all employment discrimination cases are slightly higher (15.4 percent of 9 percent is about 1.4
percent).
16
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percent of all cases with a filed motion to dismiss, which translates to
.57 percent of all cases.20
Gelbach (2016) explores the potential effects of Twiqbal later in litigation, hypothesizing the greater screening at the pleading stage
should—if the screening captures the merit of each case—lead to a
higher-quality pool of cases that reach the summary judgment stage.
Due to imprecise estimates, however, his results are inconclusive.
Michalski and Wood (2015) looked for the effect of plausibility
pleading, but not Twombly or Iqbal per se, on outcomes in state court.
Taking advantage of the fact that Nebraska adopted the Twiqbal
standard in 2010, they employed a difference-in-differences design
that compares changes in dismissal rates and other outcomes over
time in Nebraska to a set of comparison states that did not change
pleading standards. They found no evidence of a major effect on dismissals or other outcomes.
Finally, Hazelton (2015) examined whether the length and complexity of complaints changed after Twombly and Iqbal. She finds evidence that length and complexity of tort complaints rose after Twiqbal.
III.

NEW DATA

I employ two datasets. The first, which I call the “AO Data,” is
administrative data on all federal civil cases filed from 2003 to 2010.
The second, which I call the “PACER Data,” consists of docket sheets
and complaints from a stratified, random sample of federal civil cases
filed from 2005 to 2010.
These two data sets are notable for two reasons. First, the AO Data is based on a census of all cases, and the PACER Data is a representative sample of all cases. Thus, both datasets overcome the most
obvious limitation of previous studies that rely on searches of Westlaw
or other databases of published judicial opinions. Such samples are
not representative of cases as a whole, both because published opinions are not a random sample of all judicial decisions, and because
cases with judicial decisions are not a random sample of all cases.
Second, the AO Data and PACER Data are among the largest datasets of their kind yet brought to bear on the question whether
Twombly or Iqbal has had an effect. Given that lack of statistical power is a serious limitation of many previous studies on Twiqbal, these
datasets allow for higher power statistical tests capable of detecting
effects of Twiqbal. Not only does this make it more likely that, if a major effect exists, I will find it, but it also gives us more confidence that,
if no major effect is found, such an effect does not exist.
Again, the numbers for employment discrimination cases are similar, with
a lower “negatively affected share” but a higher baseline rate of cases with
motions to dismiss (10.8 percent of 9 percent is about .97 percent).
20
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A. AO Data
I have compiled a data set of over 400,000 civil cases filed in federal court from January 2003 through September 2010 using data files
collected and published by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (AO).21 My processing of the AO Data is described in detail in Hubbard (2013); the current data incorporates more recent
years of AO Data, however. One important difference from Hubbard
(2013) is that below I present results both excluding and including pro
se litigants, which, for reasons I have discussed elsewhere (see Hubbard 2016), I predict may be affected differently.22 (Hubbard [2013]
excluded pro se litigants.)
Summary statistics for the AO Data appear in Table 1. One important fact jumps from this table. In the aggregate, the rates of dismissal before and after Twombly, and before and after Iqbal, appear to
be identical. Nor does it appear that Twiqbal has led to more settlements or large changes in filing rates.23
I note here two key limitations to the AO Data. First, the AO Data
does not provide information on how many motions to dismiss were
filed. I explore the filing of motions to dismiss with the PACER Data.
Second, the AO Data does not distinguish between types of motions by
which a case can be terminated on the merits before trial, including
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Both fall into the disposition category “Judgment on
motion before trial.”24
To address this concern, I divide all cases coded as “Judgment on
motion before trial” into two groups, based on the duration of the case
at the time of termination and the prevailing party. I deem cases with
durations of at least 45 and less than 225 days, and for which the prevailing party was the defendant (or prevailing party information was
missing), to be terminated on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; I create the
dummy variable dismissal and set it equal to one for these cases. Cases of the same duration, but in which the plaintiff prevailed, may be
Rule 12(c) dispositions or other types of judgments (such as defaults). I
deem cases with durations of 225 days or more to be terminated on a
Rule 56 motion. I chose these boundaries to correspond approximately
[Note to reviewers: I am in the process of obtaining data that will permit
me to extend this dataset to include all cases filed through December 2014.
Inclusion of this data has been delayed due to technical and administrative
issues, however. Future revisions should be able to incorporate this data,
which will allow a more complete assessment of longer-term changes after
Iqbal.]
22 I also exclude certain sui generis categories of litigation, such as defaulted
student loans and prisoner litigation.
23 For reasons I explain below in Part IV.B, I focus on “early settlements,”
which are settlements that occur less than 225 days after the case is filed.
24 This category may also capture Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the
pleadings.
21
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to the minimum and maximum amounts of time from filing of a complaint to disposition of a motion to dismiss in what might be a typical
case.25 This time range is consistent with various studies of time-toruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.26
Importantly, although these precise boundaries are somewhat arbitrary, my results are not sensitive to adjustments to the bounds.27
B. PACER Data
My second dataset, which I call the “PACER Data,” is composed of
docket sheets and complaints from samples of federal civil cases filed
between 2006 and 2010. These documents are downloaded as PDF
files from the U.S. Courts’ PACER system. Due to the time and expense necessary to collect and code large numbers of docket records
and complaints, I employed a stratified sample design to increase statistical power. Rather than drawing cases from all 90 federal districts,
the PACER Data includes cases drawn from the 21 districts that could
provide sufficiently large samples of docket sheets and complaints for
three case types: employment discrimination, antitrust, and tort (a
As a default, the defendant has 20 days to file a motion to dismiss (from the
date the complaint is served; see Rule 12(a)(1)).
26 A study of docket records in eight district courts, which found that average
times to ruling varied widely across districts, but the district averages all fell
in the range of 63 to 176 days. See IAALS (2009); Kourlis and Singer (2009).
The duration range I use (45 to 224 days) also predicts dismissal and summary judgment rates consistent with the findings of studies that have calculated Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and Rule 56 summary judgment rates for specific years and districts. See Willging (1989); Cecil et al. (2007).
One concern with using this cutoff is that Twombly or Iqbal may have led
to cases taking longer before being terminated by a dismissal. One might imagine that litigating a motion to dismiss takes longer after Twiqbal. All results below, which are based on an upper limit of 224 days for dismissal, are
robust to increasing the limit to 365 days, and I find no evidence of changes
in case duration, conditional on dismissal, within either the 224 day or 365
day windows. (Results available upon request.)
27 Clermont and Eisenberg (2014, p. 205 n. 43) claim that the zero result in
Hubbard (2013) is sensitive to the choice of 224 days as the maximum duration for a 12(b)(6) dismissal, to the extent that they find that the increase in
dismissals becomes positive and significant when one includes all pretrial
judgments, rather than only those within 224 days of filing. This finding,
while interesting in its own right, does not plausibly bear on changes in
12(b)(6) dismissal rates. As noted in Hubbard (2013), the reported findings
were fully robust to changes in the time frame for dismissal. In unreported
regressions, the zero result obtains for durations of 365 and 590 days—more
than twice as long for the preferred specification. Hubbard (2013) did not examine durations greater than 590 days, both because it was implausible that
pretrial dismissals nearly two years after filing would be under Rule 12(b)(6)
rather than Rule 56 and because data for longer time windows was not then
available.
25
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mix of vehicular negligence, products liability, medical malpractice,
and the like).28
Upon completion of the data gathering and processing, however, I
determined that the antitrust data is not comparable to the other categories of cases, and I do not report results for antitrust cases.29 I also
omit tort cases from the reported results below, as they less numerous
than employment discrimination cases and yield imprecise results.
Notably, though, results for tort cases roughly track the results reported below for employment cases: apparent increases in the length
of complaints and number of amended complaints filed, but no change
in dismissals or other litigation outcomes. (In fact, out of the sample of
113 cases, only two motions to dismiss were filed (one before Twombly,
one after) and neither was granted.)
Hence, to maximize statistical power and focus my analysis on
those classes of cases most often cited as likely to be affected by
Twombly and Iqbal, I limit the sample to employment discrimination
cases—those cases designated as “civil rights: employment” cases by
the Administrative Office. Summary statistics for the PACER Data
appear in Table 2.30
To create a random sample of cases within each sampled district, I
used the AO Data to generate random samples of docket numbers
within each sampled district for the sample time frame, and then,
with the help of a team of researchers, I pulled the docket sheets corresponding to those docket numbers from PACER. For some purposes,
I drew cases from narrowly defined time ranges, and as a consequence
The districts are the California (Central, Northern, and Southern), Connecticut, DC, Florida (Middle and Southern), Georgia (Northern), Illinois
(Northern), Massachusetts, Michigan (Eastern), Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York (Eastern and Southern), Ohio (Northern), Pennsylvania (Eastern), Texas (Northern and Southern), Utah, and Washington (Western). As a practical
matter, the limiting factor was antitrust cases, which are relevant because
Twombly was an antitrust case, but which make up a very small fraction of
all federal cases.
29 Examination of administrative data and hand-coded docket records reveals
large numbers of separate but related antitrust case filings, which leads to
large numbers of virtually identical cases that are often consolidated in ways
that leads to case outcomes (such as transfer or consolidation) that are not
informative on the filing or resolution of MTDs. Given the small total size of
the federal courts’ antitrust docket, expanding the sample frame could not
overcome the obstacles to statistical power created by this fact, even if I were
able to develop reliable means for removing or recoding related cases. In any
event, results (unreported) using antitrust data reveal erratic patterns of disposition, and estimated effects of effects of Twombly and Iqbal are largely
null, even if one assumes that the results are meaningful.
30 The reader will note that MTDs are much more prevalent in the PACER
data than the 6-percent-of-cases figure mentioned above for all cases. This is
because the PACER cases are drawn from the employment discrimination
category, which has relatively high rates of MTDs. See Cecil et al. (2011a).
28
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there was no need for sampling, but I pulled all cases within the relevant time range.
Using those docket sheets, we identified and pulled from PACER
the original complaint filed in each case. Analysis of the docket sheets
and complaints proceeded in two ways. First, a team of student research assistants (undergraduate and law students at the University
of Chicago) hand-coded the docket sheets and complaints. Each handcoder worked independently and filled out an Excel spreadsheet with
entries for each case in a separate row. In addition to verbal instructions on how to complete the spreadsheet, each coder was given a
codebook defining each variable and the possible values it could take.
Each coder also was given access to a Google Docs FAQ page, on which
they could post questions, which I would answer with clarifications
about the instructions, or guidance on how to code a complaint or
docket sheet that presents a situation not contemplated by the codebook. Because this FAQ was shared by all of the coders, this method
for resolving ambiguities was designed to enhance consistency across
coders.
Hand-coding of complaints included counting paragraphs of allegations and numbers of causes of action alleged, as well as subjective
coding of the level of factual detail in the complaint. (To avoid transmitting any unconscious bias on my part to the coders, I did not provide guidance to the coders on how they should judge the factual detail
level of complaints. Further, some coders, as undergraduates, had no
exposure to cases or teaching on the subject of pleading.) To facilitate
more accurate machine-coding of complaints, hand-coders noted materials such as cover sheets and exhibits that were attached to complaints, as well as the presence of stray marks that could interfere
with accurate character recognition by text-analysis software.
Hand-coding of docket sheets included noting the number of motions to dismiss and amended complaints, whether and how motions to
dismiss were decided, and settlement and summary judgment outcomes.31
Machine-coding of the complaints utilized information provided by
hand-coders on the document characteristics of the complaints. A researcher at the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics wrote
Python code to cycle through the hand-coders’ spreadsheets for information on cover sheets and exhibit pages, find the original complaints,
remove the cover sheets and exhibit pages, and save the resulting unadorned complaint as a new .pdf file. The researcher then performed
optimal character recognition (OCR) using ABBYY FineReader on
each PDF file to create a plain text file. These text files were analyzed
The reported results include a subset of data in which all observations for
any given United States District Court were coded by the same individual for
all years, and thus any differences between coders in coding tendencies will
not bias estimates of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. (All regressions include fixed effects for district.)
31

Hubbard: Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal

15

for linguistic characteristics using the latest edition of Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, LIWC. LIWC is a software package that catalogues the words and punctuation in a text file, providing detailed statistics on the linguistic attributes of the file.
IV.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS: CONSTRUCTING THE MOSAIC
A. Methodological Considerations

How can one conclude that Twiqbal had a major effect? There must be
evidence showing an effect that is large (rather than small) and real
(rather than spurious). Put more precisely, the three criteria that constitute the gold standard for statistical evidence of a major effect are
that the estimated effect be
(1) Economically significant,
(2) Statistically significant, and
(3) Causally identified.
Economic significance is simply jargon for something being big
enough for us to consider it important. (I will sometimes use “major
effect” as shorthand for “economically significant effect.”) Thus, economic significance depends on the context, and ultimately is in the eye
of the beholder. I will treat as economically significant an effect greater than 2 percent of all filed cases. In other words, if Twombly or Iqbal
changes outcomes in two out of every hundred cases, I will consider
this a “major” change. I consider this a relatively generous standard
for a “major” change, given the alarm with which Twombly was greeted—I am saying that its effect could be “major” even if 98 percent of
all filed cases are unaffected!
The reader, of course, is free to make her own judgments about
what effects count as economically significant. Perhaps a better
threshold is whether 1 percent or 5 percent of filed cases are affected.
And perhaps a more appropriate baseline is not all filed cases, but
some other number. The results reported in this paper permit the
reader to apply whatever standard of economic significance she deems
appropriate.
With respect to changes other than case outcomes, I do not set a
threshold for economic significance, as the prior literature has not
staked out as strong predictions about changes in things such as the
length or drafting of complaints. For those outcomes, I will focus solely
on statistical significance.
Statistical significance is a criterion for concluding that the estimated effect reflects a true difference in underlying behavior between two groups (such as pre-Twombly and post-Twombly) as opposed to a difference that arose simply by random chance. If an estimated effect is not statistically significant, we lack confidence that the
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effect is anything other than zero, but for random chance. I will treat
as statistically significant any estimate with a p-value of .05 or below
(i.e., statistical significance at the “5 percent level.”) This means,
roughly, that there is only a 5 percent chance that the true difference
is zero and we obtained our (nonzero) estimate by chance.
Causal identification is jargon for an empirical test design that
permits us to conclude that the estimated differences between a
treatment group and a control group is due to the treatment (i.e.,
Twombly or Iqbal) and not some other factor. For our purposes, causal
identification means that the design of the empirical test is such that
we have some confidence that our estimated “effects” of Twiqbal were
actually caused by Twiqbal, and not by some unrelated and unobserved factor that is coincidental in timing with Twombly or Iqbal.
This is a serious concern, because there are two categories of factors
that present serious obstacles to causal inference here: (1) omitted
variable bias and (2) selection effects.
Omitted variable bias is the product of factors that an empirical
study should take into account because they influence the outcome of
interest but are omitted from the estimation, either because their relevance is not recognized or because the factors simply cannot be
measured. There are at least two potential omitted variables that
could substantially undermine the validity of estimated effects of
Twiqbal.
First, since the turn of the century, there has been an overall
downward trend in civil case filings in federal court. Thus, merely
comparing filing rates before and after Twombly, for example, would
lead one to observe a decline in filings after Twombly. Without controlling for preexisting trends in filing rates, though, it would be a mistake to conclude that Twombly caused the drop in filing rates. When
the outcome of interest is filing rates, however, this potential source of
bias is easy to correct: since trends in filing rates are observable, one
merely needs to include controls for trends when estimating the effect
of Twombly or Iqbal. The same technique could be used if there are
pre-existing trends in outcomes such as dismissal rates and settlement rates.
Second, the Great Recession unfolded in the wake of Twombly, and
just as it would be a mistake to infer that Twombly caused the Great
Recession, it would also be a mistake to ignore the possibility that
changes in behavior after Twombly or Iqbal are related to the Great
Recession. It is unlikely that the type and quality of the cases filed
during boom years are the same as the type and quality of cases filed
during a recession. Further, even identical cases may be litigated differently, if for example changed economic circumstances make parties
more willing (or less willing) to settle. Nonetheless, the existing literature has done little to address the Great Recession as a possible confounding factor in measuring the effect of Iqbal.
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There are at least two ways to handle this potential confound. The
first is to find measurable factors, such as GDP or unemployment,
that can be included in regressions as controls.32 As these factors rise
and fall during the Great Recession, they serve as proxies for the larger set of changes that can affect the composition of cases. The second
is to look for variation across space, rather than time, in the effects of
Twiqbal. While the Great Recession affected all of the United States,
and Twiqbal applied to all federal courts, Twiqbal did not affect all
state courts equally. Michalski and Wood (2015) thus present findings
for which the potentially biasing effect of the Great Recession is reduced.
Selection bias is a species of omitted variable bias, but it deserves
separate treatment here. In a world in which parties and their lawyers behave identically before and after Twiqbal, judges ruling on motions to dismiss will see the same sorts of cases and complaints before
and after Twiqbal, and thus we can easily detect an effect of Twiqbal
by looking for a difference in dismissal rates. But in the real world, if
Twombly and Iqbal really do make a difference in how cases are decided, then parties and their lawyers will take this into account. These
endogenous responses to Twombly and Iqbal may change the nature
and composition of cases that reach the motion-to-dismiss stage of litigation. Complaints may become more detailed, some cases may not be
filed that otherwise would be (or vice versa), some cases may settle
that otherwise would be decided by a motion to dismiss (or vice versa),
and so on. See Gelbach (2012) for a more extensive discussion. In principle, at least, this means that it is possible that Twombly and Iqbal
had a big effect, even though a simple comparison of dismissal rates
before and after yields no discernable change.
There is another type of selection effect, this one due to endogenous responses by judges rather than lawyers or parties. Not all district court rulings on motions to dismiss are published in legal databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg. Although over time these
databases have become increasingly comprehensive in their inclusion
of district court opinions, not all opinions on motions to dismiss are
published, if only because not all opinions on motions to dismiss are
written. And even if Twombly and Iqbal had no economically significant effect on legal practice, there is no doubt that they had a major
effect on legal doctrine. We therefore might expect district judges to
change their patterns of writing and publishing decisions on motions
to dismiss. If we rely only on published decisions, there is a concern
that the effect we are detecting is an effect on publication practices,
not courtroom outcomes.

Unreported results explore this possibility in my data, but the inclusion of
state-level GDP and unemployment controls offer surprisingly little in terms
of explanatory power.
32
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There are two ways to address selection effects, and I will employ
them both in this paper. The first way is to control for selection effects
by designing an empirical strategy to hold constant the composition of
cases that are subject to dismissal before and after Twombly (and before and after Iqbal). To the extent that we can isolate subsets of cases
that allow us to make apples-to-apples comparisons of dismissal rates
before and after Twombly, and before and after Iqbal, we can detect
the effect of Twombly and Iqbal by looking at dismissal rates. I call
this the “causal identification” method. I describe and execute this approach in Part B below.
While this method is the most direct and powerful way to detect an
effect of Twombly or Iqbal, the empirical design that I use to obtain
causal identification is only capable of detecting effects that occur soon
after each case—what I call “immediate” effects. Thus, a second method is necessary to detect effects, if any, that are delayed or build up
gradually over time.
This second method is to look for selection effects, rather than control for them. For example, if changes in settlement rates are attenuating the effect of Twiqbal on dismissal rates, then in addition to looking at dismissal rates, we can look at settlement rates to see whether
they change. I call this the “process of elimination”: if Twombly and
Iqbal have had a major effect, it might not show up in dismissal rates,
but it should show up somewhere. Thus, I will look not only at dismissal rates, but settlement rates, filing rates, the length and content of
complaints, and other potential sources of evidence for a major effect
of Twiqbal. In this method, any single estimate of an effect (whether
on dismissal rates, or filing rates, or complaint length, etc.) is only
weak evidence for or against a major effect of Twiqbal, precisely because (unlike in the first method) I am unable to fully control for confounding factors such as the effect of the Great Recession on the composition of cases. Nonetheless, taking together all of the estimates of
the various potential manifestations of the delayed effect of Twiqbal,
we can form a more complete picture of the extent to which litigation
patterns have changed in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. I undertake
this approach in Part C below.
Before I go on, I discuss here some conventions I adopt for generating and reporting results. For both the causal-identification and process-of-elimination methods, I will employ standard statistical estimation techniques. I run linear and logistic regressions of outcomes such
as dismissal rates on indicators of whether a case was before or after
Twombly or Iqbal, with fixed effects for circuit and nature-of-suit category and clustering of standard errors by district. For the logistic regressions, I report marginal effects, so that the reported coefficients
are interpretable as the change in the fraction of the cases dismissed
after Twombly or Iqbal; a coefficient of .0100 would indicate a 1 percentage point change in the dismissal rate.
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There is a special challenge in presenting results here, however,
because of the need to distinguish between three types of results:
(1) Statistically significant rejections of the null hypothesis of
no effect;
(2) Statistically significant rejections of the hypothesis of a major effect; and
(3) Null results, i.e., results that are statistically insignificant
and close to zero, but not precise enough to rule out the possibility of a major effect.
In tables reporting results, statistically significant differences will
be marked with stars or bold text.33 I will treat such results as “evidence” of an effect of Twombly or Iqbal. Note, however, that a statistically significant effect is not necessarily evidence of an economically
significant effect. I will also report whether the regression estimates
reject an alternate null hypothesis of at least a 2 percentage-point
change, i.e., an “economically significant” or “major” effect. To this
end, in addition to reporting estimated coefficients and standard errors, I include separate rows in the tables reporting regression results
labeled “Major Effect?” Here, I provide a simple indicator summarizing the regression results:
“Yes” means that that the coefficient is statistically significant
and consistent with a predicted, economically significant effect
of Twiqbal. I does not mean, however, that I can reject the possibility of an economically insignificant effect. In this way, I resolve doubts in favor of concluding that there is a major effect.
“No” means that the hypothesis of an economically significant
effect is rejected.
“Null” means that neither the null hypothesis of zero effect,
nor the alternative hypothesis of a major effect, can be rejected.
B. Controlling for Selection Effects: “Causal Identification”
1.

Establishing the Claim to Causal Identification

As I have noted, the ideal method for estimating the effect of Twombly
or Iqbal would allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of rulings on
motions to dismiss before and after the relevant ruling. To do this,

The minimum threshold for statistical significance I use herein is significance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test, which is equivalent to significance at the 2.5 percent level for a one-tailed test. (A one-tailed test is appropriate for rejecting the alternate hypothesis of an effect equal to or greater
than a given threshold).
33
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however, requires a methodology that accounts for several potentially
confounding factors, as discussed above:
1. Time trends in case filings and/or impact of the Great Recession.
2. Selection effect: endogenous change in filing of complaints.
3. Selection effect: endogenous change in settlements.
4. Selection effect: endogenous change in filing of motions to
dismiss.
5. Non-random selection of judicial decisions for publication.
To date, no prior study—none—accounts for all of these threats to
causal identification. I summarize the extent to which prior studies
address these factors in Table 3. This is not to say that prior studies
are not informative; after all, no study, not even one that makes
claims to address these threats to causal identification, is immune
from serious criticism. In Part C below, I present a framework to
which all prior studies contribute.
Here, I present my methodology for measuring the (immediate) effects of Twombly and Iqbal, based on the “straddle” method of Hubbard (2013) but with added elements such that I address all five of the
possible selection effects enumerated above. For clarity, I organize the
discussion of this methodology around how it addresses the five confounding factors listed above.
Time trends, endogenous changes in case filings, and the
Great Recession. Figure 1 illustrates the basic design for Twombly;
the design for Iqbal is the same except for the time frames used. As
Figure 1 shows, all cases in both the control and treatment groups
were filed before Twombly. However, the cases in the control group
had an opportunity to be dismissed before Twombly, whereas the cases in the treatment group were subject to the possibility of dismissal
only after Twombly.34 The same method applies to Iqbal.35
How does this design address the first two confounding factors?
First, it uses a relatively short time frame, so that estimates are not
biased by long-term trends.
Second, this method suppresses endogenous changes in case filings, because it looks only at cases filed before Twombly or Iqbal. Because Twombly’s “retirement” of the Conley dictum was largely a surFor Twombly, this means that I include cases filed April 6, 2006 to May 21,
2006 (control group) and cases filed April 6, 2007 to May 21, 2007 (treatment
group). I select these bounds based on the following logic: Twombly came
down May 21, 2007. May 21 is 45 days after April 6; presumably a motion to
dismiss will not be filed, briefed, and decided in less than 45 days.
35 For Iqbal, I include cases filed April 3, 2008 to May 18, 2008 (control group)
and cases files April 3, 2009 to May 18, 2009 (treatment group). Iqbal came
down May 18, 2009. May 18 is 45 days after April 3.
34
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prise to the bar, any effect of Twombly on the composition of filed cases would occur only with respect to cases filed after the Twombly decision. Thus, the treatment group, which is made up of cases that were
filed before Twombly but would have been dismissed (if at all) after
Twombly, should have the same composition (in terms of claims, merit, pleading style, etc.) as the control group, which are cases that were
both filed and resolved before Twombly. The same argument can be
made for Iqbal, given that it was not clear ahead of time that the Supreme Court would announce new law on plausibility pleading.36
Third, for Twombly at least, the entire sample period precedes the
Great Recession, and thus we avoid changes in the mix of disputes it
may have precipitated. For Iqbal, though, the overlap with the Great
Recession is unavoidable, and we might worry about changing case
composition, due to factors unrelated to Iqbal, even in the narrow
sample period I employ here.37
Indeed, we can directly check these claims that the cases in each
pair of treatment and control groups are similar. As part of the PACER Data, I collected one week’s worth of employment discrimination
docket sheets and complaints for each of the treatment and control
groups. Using the LIWC software, I analyzed all of these complaints to
determine the extent to which the linguistic characteristics of the
complaints are similar between treatment and control groups. The
LIWC software counts total words and words per sentence in each
complaint, as well as the percentage of all words that fall into specific
linguistic categories. These categories and examples of each appear in
Table 4. Panel A focuses on the Twombly control (2006) and treatment
(2007) groups. The linguistic characteristics of these two groups are
virtually identical, and none of the differences are statistically significant. The Twombly sample thus presents an apples-to-apples comparison in terms of the composition of filed cases.
Panel B of Table 4 focuses on the Iqbal control (2008) and treatment (2009) groups. These groups are generally similar, but tests of
differences in means reveal some statistically significant differences,
suggesting either that Iqbal was not entirely a surprise, or that the
composition of filed cases changed due to external reasons such as the
Great Recession. Examining the characteristics with significant differences, however, calls into doubt the possibility that the cases were
Or at least plausibility pleading generally. The petitions for certiorari were
addressed specifically to pleading standards and substantive doctrine regarding vicarious liability of government officials. See Petition for Certiorari, Hasty v. Iqbal, No. 07-827, 2007 WL 4466875 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2007); Petition for
Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 2008 WL 336225 (U.S. Feb. 6,
2008).
37 For evidence of changes in the composition of cases during the Great Recession, see Cecil et al. (2011a), who document a tripling in the number of
“financial instruments” (read: home foreclosure and debt collection) cases between 2006 and 2010.
36
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changing in anticipation of Iqbal. All of the changes are in the wrong
direction—detail seems to be going down: indicators of complexity
(“words per sentence” and “words longer than six letters”) are declining as a percentage of all words, while some vague language (“tentative words”) is going up. Nonetheless, there is evidence that something
about the cases changed between 2008 and 2009, perhaps related to
the Great Recession, which means we must be cautious in drawing
inferences regarding Iqbal.
Endogenous changes in settlements. Because cases that are
filed shortly before Twombly (or Iqbal) can be settled after, the “straddle” method described here cannot in itself preclude selection effects
due to changes in settlement patterns. Thus, there is the possibility of
selection effects before the motion to dismiss stage, at what I will call
the “early settlement stage.” By “early settlements,” I mean settlements that occur between the filing of a lawsuit and the end of the
224-day window that I use for when motion to dismiss can be granted.
To rule out this possibility (to the extent the data permits), I directly check for changes in early settlement rates among cases in both
the Twombly sample and the Iqbal samples.38 In Table 5, I report the
results of regressions where the outcome variable is the settlement
rate during the first 224 days of litigation—the same window during
which I allow for dismissal in the AO Data. Panel A presents results
for the Twombly treatment and control groups, and Panel B presents
results for the Iqbal groups. I present results both including and excluding pro se cases, and for all cases and specifically for employment
discrimination cases.39 All of the relevant coefficients are statistically
insignificant and close to zero, although for some specifications, one
cannot rule out the possibility of economically significant effects. This
provides some assurance that our ability to infer effects from changes
in dismissal rates is not compromised by changes in settlement patterns.

In the analysis herein, I test for changes in settlement rates. Ideally, however, one would test for changes in the composition of settled cases in addition to changes in settlement rates. This is because offsetting changes in settlement patterns of different groups can leave the overall rate of settlement
unchanged. For example, if Twiqbal effected a meaningful increase in the
courts’ ability to screen cases on apparent merit, plaintiffs may choose to settle (for a small sum) relatively weak cases that previously would have been
litigated, while defendants may litigate (by filing a MTD) somewhat stronger
cases that previously would have been settled (for a somewhat larger sum). If
these two groups of cases are about the same size, the settlement rate may
not change significantly, even though the composition of litigated cases has
meaningfully changed. Without data on settlement amounts—which is notoriously hard to get—it is difficult to directly test for such a change.
39 Recall that much of the literature on the negative effects of Twombly and
Iqbal expresses concern over a greater impact on employment discrimination
plaintiffs and pro se plaintiffs.
38
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Endogenous changes in filings of motions to dismiss. The
fourth potential confound, changes in defendants filing motions to
dismiss, is eliminated by my choice of outcome variable: share of all
filed cases that are terminated by dismissal. For a case to end in this
way, it must be the case that both the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the court granted it. Thus, a rise in either of these would
lead to a rise in the percentage of cases dismissed.40
Endogenous changes in publication of judicial opinions. The
final potential confound, the non-random selection of judicial decisions
for publication, is eliminated by my choice of data. All data I collect is
based on court records of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
which contain all federal civil cases during the sample period.
With these assurances about a lack of potential confounds (but
with a caveat about the Great Recession and the Iqbal data), I now
estimate the immediate effects of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissal
rates.
2.

Results

Table 6 presents the results. Panel A focuses on Twombly. In all
specifications, we find evidence of no effect; the largest effect not ruled
out is less than 2 percent of cases. This is true for both represented
and pro se plaintiffs.41
Panel B focuses on Iqbal. Again, in all specifications there is evidence of no effect. Thus, I can rule out the possibility of economically
significant effects. In sum, there is no evidence that Twombly or Iqbal
had an immediate effect on the tendency of district courts to dismiss
complaints with prejudice. Indeed, the causal identification method I
employ provides affirmative evidence that these cases did not have
any major effect on dismissal rates.
C. Looking for Selection Effects: “Process of Elimination”
One may be skeptical that it is feasible to construct a test for the effects of Twiqbal that has solid causal identification. Further, one may
want to search for evidence of a delayed effect of Twiqbal. Pre-existing
trends in case filings, the near-simultaneity of Iqbal and the Great
Recession, and the possibility of selection effects attenuating any effect of Twiqbal on dismissal rates together pose serious challenges to
Of course, this assumes that Twombly or Iqbal would not lead to a drop in
the filings of motions to dismiss. This would be possible, perhaps, if a higher
rate of settlement led to fewer motions to dismiss, but given no evidence of a
rise in early settlement rates, a more generous standard to defendants should
lead to a rise in motions to dismiss.
41 The coefficients on the “Twombly × pro se” variable supply the estimated
effect of Twombly on pro se plaintiffs, relative to the effect on represented
plaintiffs.
40
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the empirical researcher. Can anything further be done? Must we ignore the studies that do not attempt causal identification?
In my view, something can be done, and we can make use of studies that lack a serious effort at causal identification. The methodology
I propose here can be described as a “process of elimination.” If we
cannot control for selection effects and undertake an apples-to-apples
comparison of cases before and after Twombly or Iqbal, we must instead ask ourselves, “What do we expect to see, given that we have
controlled for as much as possible, but cannot control for selection effects, which may or may not be present?” In answering this question,
we will generate a series of hypotheses. Rejecting or accepting any one
of them will hardly be conclusive, because we cannot be sure that selection effects, rather than treatment effects (i.e., the effect of
Twombly or Iqbal), are not at play. But rejecting or accepting each hypothesis lets us rule out or rule in the possibility of a major effect of
Twiqbal, conditional on the presence or absence of certain selection
effects. While this process of elimination cannot account for every way
that Twiqbal might have had an indirect effect, or every way that selection effects might prevent us from observing an effect—after all, I’m
making no claim to causal identification here!—the accumulation of
results will start to form a picture of behavioral changes after Twiqbal
that will render alternative possibilities less likely.
1.

Hypothesis 1: Assumption of No Selection Effects

Let us begin with the simplest case: a world in which there are no
(meaningful) selection effects. This may or may not be the world we
live in; just because actors in the legal system respond endogenously
to changes in legal rules does not mean that selection effects are of
sufficient magnitude that we cannot detect major effects of Twiqbal.
Indeed, Klerman and Lee (2014) show that under a range of plausible
assumptions, while selection effects can attenuate the effects of law
changes on case outcomes, major effects will still be detectable. Thus,
notwithstanding all the efforts at causal identification presented in
this paper, it may be entirely proper to assume that selection effects
are not a first-order concern.
If they are not, then a simple before-versus-after comparison of
dismissal rates will tell us the effect of Twiqbal. The change in motion
to dismiss grant rates can manifest itself with respect to either or both
of dismissals with prejudice and dismissals without prejudice. If dismissals with prejudice rise—and this is the concern that has motivated most of the concerns about Twiqbal—then the effect will show up in
the rate at which cases are terminated. If dismissals without prejudice
rise, this will show up in case terminations (if plaintiffs do not replead) or in the filing of amended complaints.
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Further, even if the rate at which courts grant motions to dismiss
does not change, the number of dismissals could rise if more motions
to dismiss are filed.
Also, if there is a rise in dismissals (with prejudice), we might expect to see downstream effects. By definition, fewer cases will reach
discovery and settlement, summary judgment, or trial. And if the rate
of settlement does not change, this means that fewer cases will reach
the summary judgment stage, and the quality of those cases may
change. As Gelbach (2016) argues, if dismissals do a good job screening out weaker cases, then the rate at which defendants win summary
judgment may fall. If dismissals do a poor job, the rate may not
change or may rise.
Taken together, the assumption of no selection effects yields the
following set of predictions:
Hypothesis 1(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in dismissals (with prejudice) as a fraction of all cases.
Hypothesis 1(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in dismissals without prejudice as a fraction of all
cases.
Hypothesis 1(c). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in the total number of motions to dismiss filed.
Hypothesis 1(d). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant change in the number of cases terminated due to summary judgment in favor of the defendant as a fraction of all
cases.
Table 8 collects the existing studies that generate results bearing
on Hypothesis 1. Table 8a summarizes findings relevant to all cases,
while Table 8b focuses on findings specific to cases filed by pro se
plaintiffs. Table 8 reveals the following:
H1(a). With respect to all cases, the overwhelming majority of
results are null results, and the two statistically significant results on Hypothesis 1(a) point in opposite directions: Gelbach
(2012) finds a statistically significant lower bound (.57 percent
of all cases) on the effect of Twombly and Iqbal combined, while
Hubbard (2013) finds a statistically significant zero result for
the effect of Twombly (no more than .40 percent of all cases).
H1(b). Several studies have looked at rulings on motions to
dismiss, and all have found a statistically significant rise in
dismissals without prejudice after Twombly or Iqbal.
H1(c). Cecil (2011a,b) found a 2.2 percentage-point increase
from 2006 to 2010 in the share of cases in which a motion to
dismiss was filed.
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H1(d). Two studies have looked for downstream effects of
Twiqbal, but they have found only null results.42
H1, pro se cases. To the extent that prior work has looked at
pro se plaintiffs, it tends to find a statistically significant rise
in outcomes adverse to plaintiffs.
With these findings in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis
of the AO Data and PACER Data. I begin with Hypothesis 1(a) and
employ a graphical presentation before turning to regression results.
The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate at which filed
cases are dismissed. Figure 2 plots the fraction of cases filed in a given
year that are eventually dismissed.43 I take advantage of the fact that
Twombly and Iqbal occurred almost exactly two years apart to divide
the data into one-year intervals beginning on May 19 of each calendar
year. For example, the one-year period before Twombly is given by the
data point labeled 2006–07, and the one-year period after Iqbal is given by the data point labeled 2009–10. Figure 2 presents dismissal
rates for all cases, all civil rights, cases, and all employment cases. In
all three of these cuts of the AO Data, dismissal rates are flat
throughout the time period.44
Tables 9 and 10 report regression results, controlling for differences across circuits and types of cases, as well as correlations within
districts. (The reader will note that Tables 9 and 10 examine the same
outcome as Table 6. Tables 9 and 10 have the benefits of larger sample
sizes and longer time frames, but at the cost of no claim to causal
identification.) Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report results excluding
pro se plaintiffs. The results are fairly precise zeros, and I can easily
reject the hypothesis of a major effect of Twombly or Iqbal.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 include pro se plaintiffs. Here, the
estimated effect on represented plaintiffs is again a precise zero, but
Both Gelbach (2016) and Reinert (2015) report no meaningful change in
summary judgments granted in favor of defendants. Reinert (2015, Table 13)
reports a fall in plaintiffs’ overall success rate from 71% for cases with MTDs
in 2006 to 62% for cases with MTDs in 2010, although no significance levels
are reported. During the same interval from 2006 to 2010, Reinert reports a
rise in “unresolved” cases from 3% to 17%, presumably due to the fact that
the cases from 2010, being about 4 years more recently filed, are much less
likely than cases from 2006 to have concluded by the time the sample was
collected. Among resolved cases, plaintiffs’ success rate is 73% in 2006 and
75% in 2010.
43 Recall that the definition used here is dismissal by the court on a judgment
before trial between 45 and 224 days after filing. The pattern is robust to
changes in this definition. Recall, too, that I define “all” cases to exclude large
but sui generis categories of cases, such as student loan defaults and prisoner
petitions. This is consistent with the existing literature, and does not change
the overall results.
44 Results for antitrust cases are qualitatively similar, but as noted above
may not be reliable and are not reported herein.
42
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the interaction terms “Twombly × Pro se” and “Iqbal × Pro se” are positive and significant. This indicates that Twombly and Iqbal each were
followed by statistically significant rises in the rate at which courts
dismissed cases brought by pro se plaintiffs. Note, however, that this
apparent effect, though statistically significant, is small, and I can reject the hypothesis of a “major” change. In short, Table 9 indicates no
effect for represented plaintiffs, and a small but statistically significant effect for pro se plaintiffs.
Table 10 repeats the exercise for employment discrimination cases.
Here, I find fairly precise zeros for the apparent effect on both represented and pro se plaintiffs. This tends to undermine the oft-stated
prediction that employment discrimination plaintiffs have been particularly harmed by Twiqbal.
One concern with using AO Data, as noted above, is that it does
not distinguish motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim from
other pretrial judgments on the merits. The PACER Data, which reflects examination of docket sheets for details of the basis for case disposition, addresses this concern. In Table 11, Panel A, I use the PACER Data to replicate the approach taken with the AO Data. Columns
(1) and (2) estimate the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissals
with prejudice. All results are null, and the coefficients are substantively small, although I cannot rule out economically significant magnitudes.
Columns (3) and (4) use a different dependent variable. Rather
than dismissal with prejudice, these specifications focus on cases terminated after a plaintiff did not file an amended complaint when the
original complaint was dismissed without prejudice. (These cases
would be treated as equivalent to dismissals with prejudice in the AO
Data.) Here again, all results are null.
The PACER Data’s information on dismissals without prejudice allows me to examine H1(b) as well. Panel B of Table 11 uses the number of dismissals without prejudice as the dependent variable. (Note
that dismissal without prejudice can occur multiple times in a single
case.) Estimated effects of Twombly and Iqbal are very small and statistically insignificant.
Hypothesis H1(c) predicts an increase in the tendency of defendants to files motions to dismiss. Given that there is no expectation
that judges will be less willing to grant motions to dismiss after Twiqbal, one might expect a large increase in motions to dismiss to imply a
large increase in dismissals—and we have already seen that the latter
has not happened. Perhaps surprisingly, then, the data indicate a
sharp rise in the rates at which defendants file motions to dismiss, at
least after Iqbal. Panel C of Table 11 reports the results of a regression with the number of motions to dismiss filed as the dependent variable. While there is a null result for Twombly, the estimated coefficient for the effect of Iqbal is highly significant and would represent
an additional motion to dismiss being filed in nearly 13 percent of all
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cases. Given that motions to dismiss were filed in about 20 percent of
cases in 2005 in the PACER Data, this is an enormous increase over
the pre-Twombly period! I will return to the question of how such a
large increase in motions to dismiss could have so little effect on dismissal rates below, as I continue the “process of elimination.”
Hypothesis H1(d) considers whether changes in dismissal rates
have downstream effects in litigation. Given the small and statistically insignificant point estimates of changes in dismissal rates, it is unlikely that Twombly and Iqbal would have any effects on summary
judgment rates or the like, and the results in Panel D of Table 11 confirm this prediction. Columns (1) and (2) present results of regressions
with summary judgment in favor of the defendant as the dependent
variable. All results are null, and in fact the point estimates for Iqbal
are negative.
***
Now, what can we conclude, given that Hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), and
1(d) have been rejected? We have rejected the joint claim that (1)
Twiqbal had a major effect on dismissals and (2) there are no selection
effects. On the other hand, it appears that the data support Hypothesis 1(c), that filings of motions to dismiss will rise.
If we are looking for an effect on case outcomes (rather than motion practice), it is still possible that Twiqbal had a major effect, but if
so, we must now look for the selection effects that are operating and
possibly masking the effect on dismissals. To do this, we can work
backward from the motion to dismiss and look for evidence at earlier
stages in the litigation process.
Let’s take a look at the stages of primary behavior and litigation
that lead up to the dismissal decision, working our way backward
from the dismissal decision. (Figure 3 serves as an outline for the discussion that follows.) We begin with the possibility that patterns of
settlement between the filing of the complaint and any ruling on a motion to dismiss have changed in response to Twiqbal, and this change
in the composition of cases being litigated has masked the effect of
Twiqbal on dismissal rates.
2.

Hypothesis 2: Assumption of No Selection Effects before
Early Settlement

There is the possibility that there are selection effects before the motion to dismiss stage, at the early settlement stage. Even if the exact
same cases with the exact same complaints are filed before and after
Twiqbal, patterns of settlement may change—for example, some
plaintiffs may have to settle for small sums in order to avoid a motion
to dismiss under the plausibility pleading standard. This yields our
second prediction:
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Hypothesis 2. Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant
rise in observed early settlements as a fraction of all cases.
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 2. Pereya
& Sunshine (2015) find no change in settlement rates after Twombly
or Iqbal statistically significant at the 5 percent level. With this finding in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of the AO Data
and PACER Data.
I begin with a graphical presentation before turning to regression
results. The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate at which
filed cases are settled early. Figure 4 plots the fraction of all cases, civil rights cases, and employment cases filed in a given year (beginning
May 19) that are settled early.45 In all three data series, there is no
perceptible change in early settlement rates after either Twombly or
Iqbal.
I now turn to regression analysis, using the same specification as
above, except with early settlement, rather than dismissal, as the outcome of interest. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 13 report results for all
cases in the AO Data. Columns (3) and (4) report results for employment cases. No results find a significant change, and with only one
exception (settlement rates for pro se, employment discrimination
plaintiffs after Iqbal) all reject the hypothesis of a major effect.
Data on early settlement from the PACER Data present a slightly
different picture. Table 14 presents results of linear and logistic regressions of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on early settlement rates.
Interestingly, although the estimated coefficients for Iqbal are very
small, positive, and statistically insignificant, the estimated coefficients for Twombly are larger in magnitude, negative, and in the logistic specification they are statistically significant.
Taken together, the AO Data and PACER Data suggest no major
effect on early settlement patterns, although the PACER Data raise
the possibility that motion practice directed to pleadings may have
crowded out early settlement in the immediate aftermath of Twombly.
This is consistent with the premise that uncertainty about legal
standards inhibits settlement because it increases the likelihood that
the parties have divergent expectations about their probabilities of
success.
***
At this point, we have rejected the Hypothesis that Twiqbal has
increased dismissals or other adverse case terminations for plaintiffs,
but we are beginning to see a pattern emerge of changes to litigation
practice even if not litigation outcomes. We saw above that filings
rates for motions to dismiss have risen, and we now see evidence, albeRecall that the definition used here is settlement between 45 and 224 days
after filing. The pattern is robust to changes in this definition.
45
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it quite mixed, of a change in early settlement rates. It is still possible
that Twiqbal has had a major effect in other respects, but if so, we
must now look for selection effects earlier in the process. This brings
us to our third step.
3.

Hypothesis 3: Assumption of No Selection Effects before
Pleading

Next, there is the possibility that Twiqbal changed the way that complaints are pleaded. Even if the same cases are filed before and after
Twiqbal, plaintiffs and their attorneys may have changed how they
plead in order to avoid the specter of dismissal under a new, higher
pleading standard. This can take the form of original complaints containing more factual detail, as well as show up in an increase in the
filing of amended complaints, either in anticipation of (or in response
to) a dismissal with leave to amend. This yields our third prediction:
Hypothesis 3(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in the observed length and/or detail in original complaints.
Hypothesis 3(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in the number of amended complaints.
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 3. Hazelton (2015) finds no statistically significant change in measures of
pleading specificity in civil rights complaints after Twombly or Iqbal,
but does find a statistically significant increase in measures of pleading specificity in torts complaints after Iqbal but not after Twombly.
With this finding in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of
the PACER Data. (The AO Data contains no information on pleadings.)
Table 15 presents results for Hypothesis 3. It presents the results
of hand coding and automated text analysis of the PACER Data. Panel
A examines several measures of the length and factual detail of complaints that speak to H3(a). “Word Count” is generated by the LIWC
software; “Factual Paragraphs” is a count of the number of paragraphs
judged by the coder to contain factual allegations. “Number of Legal
Claims” is a count of the separate causes of action alleged in a complaint; a drop in this count may indicate that plaintiffs have been deterred from bringing particular causes of action, even Twiqbal has not
deterred lawsuits as a whole. “Detail score” reflects the coder’s holistic
judgment about the amount of factual detail in the complaint. For
none of these measures do Twombly or Iqbal have any statistically
significant effect.46 In short, there is no support for Hypothesis 3(a) in
the data.
In unreported results, I also examine changes in other attributes of the
pleading text, as measured by LIWC, such as “number words,” “certainty
46
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Panel B bears on Hypothesis 3(b). It measures the change in number of times a complaint is amended in given case. Here we see evidence of a large change. In the first row of Panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether an amended complaint was filed in
the case; the estimated coefficients reflect the change in the share of
cases in which a complaint was amended. In the second row, the dependent variable is the total number of amended complaints filed in
each case. Thus, the estimated coefficients in this regression capture
changes in the frequency of amendment; even a case that would have
seen an amended complaint before Twiqbal, had it been filed then,
would have more amendments if filed after Twiqbal. Although not all
coefficients are statistically significant, most are, and the magnitudes
of the coefficients are fairly consistent across regressions. It appears
that Twombly and Iqbal are associated with a large increase in repleading: approximately a 10 percentage point increase in the number
of cases in which an amended complaints is filed.
***
Now what, given rejection of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and these mixed
results for Hypothesis 3? As the discussion of Hypothesis 1 indicates,
there appears to have been a dramatic escalation in motion-to-dismiss
filing activity, but no corresponding increase in dismissals, either with
or without prejudice. We now see why this may be so. Although plaintiffs’ lawyers may not have substantially changed their drafting practices for initial pleadings, it appears that they consistently are able to
respond to a motion to dismiss by repleading in greater detail.
The data lend some further support to this interpretation of the
results. In cases without motions to dismiss filed, an amended complaint is filed only 20.2 percent of the time, while in case with a motion to dismiss filed, an amended complaint is filed 48.5 percent of the
time. Thus, the results so far indicate that although Twiqbal may
have had only modest effects on case outcomes, pleading and motion
practice appear to have responded in significant ways.
Of course, it is also possible that Twiqbal had statistically significant effects earlier in the litigation process. This brings us to our
fourth step.
4.

Hypothesis 4: Assumption of No Selection Effects before
the Decision to Sue

Next, there is the possibility that Twiqbal has not affected filed cases
because it has deterred from filing those plaintiffs whose cases would
have been affected. It may also change pre-suit settlement patterns,
words,” “words per sentence,” “words longer than six letters,” and other potential markers of attempts to plead in greater factual detail. These regressions yield null results as well.
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which could either lead to an increase in filings (because defendants
refuse to settle) or a decrease in filings (because plaintiffs are willing
to settle for less). It is also possible that Twiqbal has increased the
number of state court cases removed to federal court by defendants.
This yields our fourth prediction:
Hypothesis 4(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant change in the number of original federal case filings, relative to trend.
Hypothesis 4(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant rise in the number of cases removed from state court to
federal court, relative to trend.
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 4. Curry
and Ward (2013) finds no statistically significant change in removal
rates from state court to federal court after Twiqbal. With this finding
in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of the AO Data. (The
PACER Data does not bear on this Hypothesis.)
I begin with a graphical presentation before turning to regression
results. The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate of original case filings and removals. Figure 5 plots the yearly filing rates of
all cases, civil rights cases, and employment cases. In all three data
series, there is no perceptible change in filing rates after either
Twombly or Iqbal. There is a downward trend in filings that begins
before Twombly but levels off around the time of Iqbal. Given that
there is no claim that Iqbal would lead to an increase in filings relative to trend, this break in trend is best explained as the result of the
Great Recession.
I now turn to regression analysis, using the same specification as
above, except that the unit of analysis is not the case, but the districtmonth, and the outcome of interest is number of filings in that district
during that month. Table 16 reports results from regressions where
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of original case filings. Table 17 reports results where the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of removals from state court.47 In these regressions,
I attempt to control for trends several different ways.48 The results are
inconclusive. Once I control for time trends, results are not statistically significant, and one of the point estimates is the “wrong” sign. The
estimates are imprecise, which means that although I find no evidence
I use logs because the number of filings varies widely across districts, and
we should expect the effect of Twiqbal to reduce filings per district proportionally to the total number of filings in the district rather than by an absolute number. (For example, a district with 10 filings and district with 100
filings might both see filings drop by 10 percent, not by 10 filings.) The coefficient on a logged variable is approximately the estimated percentage change.
48 In addition to the baseline specification with a linear time trend, I include
quadratic and cubic time terms. Inclusion of higher-order polynomials does
not improve inference.
47
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in favor of Hypothesis 4, I cannot rule out the possibility of large effects in the predicted direction. In other words, while these results
provide no evidence of an effect of Twombly and Iqbal on case filing,
they provide no evidence against such an effect, either.
***
Now, where do we stand? We have inconclusive results on original
filings and removals. Thus, we cannot rule out a major effect here, but
we still lack affirmative evidence of a major effect. They only place left
to look for such affirmative evidence is in the behavior farthest removed from litigation. I turn to this possibility now.
5.

Hypothesis 5: Effect on Primary Behavior

Finally, there is the possibility that the change in the pleading standard affected primary behavior in a significant way. Given that some
cases that previously would have made it to discovery will now be
dismissed, potential defendants may now be more willing to violate
the law. Measuring this effect is no small task, of course, and given
how modest the effects that appear to exist in every stage of litigation,
it is doubtful that a significant effect could exist at the point most remote from the direct effects of Twombly and Iqbal.49 Nonetheless,
primary behavior is of primary importance to evaluating the effects of
any legal change, and thus I note the final hypothesis here:
Hypothesis 5. Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant
increase in behavior that could lead to civil liability (but which
may now be less likely to do so).
V.

CONCLUSION: VIEWING THE MOSAIC
With two methodologies and two datasets, each with subparts, and
a large literature to build upon, this paper has attempted to cover a lot
of ground. I encapsulate the findings in Table 18. To sum up:
Causal Identification. After a careful effort to address
threats to causal identification, and using both AO Data and
PACER Data, I reject the hypothesis of an economically significant, immediate effect of Twombly or Iqbal. The claim to causal
identification for Iqbal, however, is weaker than for Twombly,

The PACER Data codes for the presence of damages demands, punitive
damages claims, and the amount of damages alleged, and I had planned to
measure effects on primary behavior by looking for shifts in damages demanded. Feedback from coders, however, indicated that the data on ad damnums is likely unreliable; and in any event such data is missing for 78 percent of all otherwise-coded observations.
49
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due to the difficulty of controlling for the effects of the Great
Recession.
Process of Elimination. Collecting both existing results from
the literature and new results using both AO Data and PACER
Data, I look for a wide range of direct and indirect effects of
Twombly and Iqbal, including delayed effects. As Figures 2, 4,
and 5 illustrate, there is little evidence of economically significant effects on dismissal rates, settlement rates, or filings.
There is, however, evidence of a rise in motion to dismiss filing
rates, and—rather than a rise in dismissal rates—a corresponding rise in the filing of amended complaints. There is evidence from the existing literature of effects on rates of dismissal without prejudice and of larger impacts on pro se plaintiffs.
The mosaic of my new results and results from existing studies
forms a surprisingly coherent picture of the fallout from Twombly and
Iqbal, at least for represented plaintiffs: no change in dismissal rates,
settlement rates, or filings, but an increase in attention to pleading by
both plaintiffs and defendants. For pro se plaintiffs, there is some evidence of small but statistically significant effects on case outcomes.
Still, there remains the question of what they mean. None of these
conclusions change the fact that Twombly and Iqbal are the most important decisions on federal pleading in a half-century, nor can they
change the fact that these cases have become prominent fixtures in
debates among practitioners, judges, and academics on civil procedure.
But the accumulating mass of empirical findings tends to refute
the claims that Twombly and Iqbal touched off anything like a revolution in legal practice, or that Twombly and Iqbal have had devastating
effects on plaintiffs generally, or even employment discrimination
plaintiffs in particular.
Taken together, these findings tend to corroborate the view of the
civil litigation process that I emphasize in Hubbard (2016), one in
which the economic incentives of litigants may be sufficiently powerful
that some aspects of legal doctrine do not affect case outcomes, because they do not impose binding constraints on behavior. To be more
concrete, given the often great expense associated with litigation, potential plaintiffs will rarely file suit unless they already have at their
disposal facts sufficient to satisfy them that they have a good shot at
prevailing, and this will be true regardless of whether the pleading
standard requires the plaintiff to plead facts or not. While it may have
been true that a complaint that failed to a state a plausible claim for
relief would have survived a motion to dismiss in the time before
Twombly, it would have been rare that such a complaint would ever be
filed in the first place.
Put another way, the Supreme Court’s statements on plausibility
pleading in Twombly and Iqbal may have merely written into doctrine
an approach to pleading that reflected, to some extent, existing prac-
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tice. But it is important to recognize that the Court’s pronouncements
were nonetheless destabilizing, at least insofar as pleadings and motion practice did react to the new doctrine.
The fact that plausibility may have been implicitly, even if not explicitly, a part of prior practice explains how a rise in motions to dismiss could fail to budge the rates at which complaints are dismissed
with prejudice: even if a plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts in her
original complaint, she almost certain knows facts that she can plead
in an amended complaint that, at the very least, make the claim for
relief plausible. This also explains why we might see a differential effect for pro se plaintiffs; unsophisticated parties may have a poor
sense of whether their facts entitle them to relief, and thus more pro
se complaints may be marginal under a plausibility pleading standard.
Finally, I note that the normative import of these results is ambiguous. While the lack of a dramatic and obviously harmful effect on
plaintiffs suggests that the normative stakes for Twiqbal are lower
than originally assumed, the increase in pleading activity suggests
that Twiqbal has not been costless to litigants (or judges).On the other
hand, the increase in pleading activity may have some benefits as
well. If a motion to dismiss induces a plaintiff to provide a more complete picture of the claim, this may sharpen the issues going forward
in a way that reduces costs later in the process. Thus, while this paper
has identified empirical effects of Twombly and Iqbal on court practice, it leaves for another day the task of evaluating the costs and benefits of these effects.
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FIGURES

FIGURE 1: “STRADDLE” DESIGN FOR MEASURING EFFECT OF TWOMBLY
May 21, 2006

Filings

Dismissal
Opportunities

Control Group

May 21, 2007 (Twombly)

Filings

Dismissal
Opportunities

Treatment Group

Note. The design for Iqbal is identical, except with dates May 18, 2008, and May 18, 2009 (Iqbal), respectively.
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FIGURE 2: DISMISSAL RATES, BY YEAR FILED 2003–2009,
YEARS BEGINNING MAY 19
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Note. “Dismissal” refers to judgment against plaintiff on motion before trial during the first 224 days of a case.
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FIGURE 3: STAGES OF ACTIVITY LITIGATION AND HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF TWIQBAL
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FIGURE 4: EARLY SETTLEMENT RATES, BY YEAR FILED 2003–2009,
YEARS BEGINNING MAY 19
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Note. “Early settlement” refers to settlement during the first 224 days of a case.

2009-10

Employment
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FIGURE 5: YEARLY CASE FILING RATES 2003–2009,
YEARS BEGINNING MAY 19
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TABLES
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS, AO DATA
Year Beginning May 19
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

All Cases

Filings
Dismissal Rate
Settlement Rate

82,520
.014
.216

83,389
.015
.217

81,573
.013
.223

82,940
.012
.218

84,356
.012
.201

Antitrust

Filings
Dismissal Rate
Settlement Rate

678
.021
.090

775
.014
.090

883
.016
.050

691
.005
.164

472
.022
.055

Civil Rights

Filings
Dismissal Rate
Settlement Rate

21,914
.017
.160

21,403
.017
.163

20,956
.014
.167

22,064
.012
.174

22,686
.012
.154

Employment

Filings
Dismissal Rate
Settlement Rate

10,875
.011
.150

10,414
.011
.163

9,845
.010
.163

10,157
.009
.172

10,689
.009
.158

Shares

Tort
Contract
Civil Rights

.068
.260
.266

.066
.270
.257

.066
.269
.257

.061
.306
.266

.063
.296
.269

Notes. Years correspond to one-year intervals relative to Iqbal decision. Twombly was decided May 21, 2007, and
Iqbal was decided May 18, 2009.

Hubbard: Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal

45

TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS, PACER DATA
Calendar Year of Filing
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Dismissal w/ Prej.

.035

.041

.047

.045

.056

.070

Dismissal w/o Prej.,
No Amendment

.009

0

.008

.017

0

.010

SJ for Defendant

.180

.189

.228

.168

.161

.134

Plaintiff Loss

.215

.219

.284

.224

.217

.204

Early Settlement

.105

.041

.032

.045

.112

.075

No. of MTDs Filed

.219

.291

.228

.296

.434

.378

No. of Amendments

.219

.316

.362

.486

.469

.393

Factual
Paragraphs

23.7

30.8

27.2

26.3

29.3

26.3

Number of Claims

3.31

3.47

2.94

3.25

3.71

3.19

Detail Score

3.15

3.23

3.17

3.22

3.27

3.30

228

196

127

179

143

201

2140

2334

1922

2346

2516

2520

386

376

211

326

175

352

Indicator Variables

Continuous Variables

N
Machine-Coded Variables
Word Count
N

Note. Means reported. Standard deviations omitted for clarity but available
upon request.
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TABLE 3. ACCOUNTING FOR THREATS TO CAUSAL IDENTIFICATION IN PRIOR WORK
Hubbard
(2013)
Time Trend /
Great Recession

X

Selection: Filing of
Complaints

X

Selection: Pre-MTD
Settlement

Gelbach
(2012)

FJC (2011); Reinert (2015);
Clermont & Eisenberg (2014)

Other
Studies*

X
X

Selection: Filing of MTDs

X

X

Selection: Publication

X

X

X

Notes. * Hannon (2008); Hatamyar (2010); Hatamyar Moore (2012); Brescia (2012); Dodson (2012); Seiner (2009, 2010); Isaacharoff and
Miller (2013); Quintanilla (2013, 2011); Janssen (2011); Pereyra and Sunshine (2015).
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TABLE 4. PACER SAMPLE RESULTS: COMPLAINT ANALYSIS
PANEL A. TWOMBLY
2006

2007

P-value

Word Count

2931

3146

.519

Words per Sentence

28.3

31.9

.327

% Dictionary Words

59.4

58.0

.137

% Words Longer
than Six Letters

28.0

27.3

.215

% Quantifier Words
(e.g., few, many, much)

1.73

1.72

.847

% Number Words
(e.g., second, thousand)

.40

.42

.522

% Perceptual Words
(e.g., observe, heard, feel)

.46

.44

.692

% Tentative Words
(e.g., maybe, perhaps)

1.43

1.35

.382

% Certainty Words
(e.g., always, never)

.98

.89

.059

N

128

119

Notes. Sample is all employment cases filed May 14–20 of 2006 and 2007.
Reported p-values are from a t-test for difference in means. p-values below
.05 appear in bold. Text analysis used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC 2007) software.
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TABLE 4 (CONT.). PACER SAMPLE RESULTS: COMPLAINT ANALYSIS
PANEL B. IQBAL
2008

2009

P-value

Word Count

2795

2919

.646

Words per Sentence

30.5

28.0

.014

% Dictionary Words

59.5

59.0

.571

% Words Longer
than Six Letters

28.3

26.9

.011

% Quantifier Words
(e.g., few, many, much)

1.59

1.72

.069

% Number Words
(e.g., second, thousand)

.44

.48

.280

% Perceptual Words
(e.g., observe, heard, feel)

.36

.42

.241

% Tentative Words
(e.g., maybe, perhaps)

1.31

1.50

.010

% Certainty Words
(e.g., always, never)

.85

.90

.257

N

127

120

84

Notes. Sample is all employment cases filed May 11–17 of 2008 and 2009.
Reported p-values are from a t-test for difference in means. p-values below
.05 appear in bold. Text analysis used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC 2007) software.
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TABLE 5: IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON EARLY SETTLEMENT RATE, AO DATA
PANEL A. TWOMBLY

Model
Twombly
Major
Effect?

(1)
All Cases

(2)
All Cases

(3)
Empl.
Discr.

(4)
Empl.
Discr.

.0096
(.0105)

.0090
(.0102)

–.0196
(.0146)

–.0202
(.0141)

Null

Null

No

No

Pro se
Twombly ×
Pro se
Major
Effect?
N

14,157

–.0933**
(.0150)

–.0938**
(.0217)

–.0005
(.0206)

.0192
(.0283)

Null

Null

16,217

2,014

2,446

PANEL B. IQBAL

Model
Iqbal
Major
Effect?

(1)
All Cases

(2)
All Cases

(3)
Empl.
Discr.

(4)
Empl.
Discr.

.0057
(.0079)

.0073
(.0079)

.0025
(.0197)

.0036
(.0198)

Null

Null

Null

Null

Pro se

–.1206**
(.0128)

–.0848**
(.0296)

Iqbal ×
Pro se

.0010
(.0165)

–.0074
(.0381)

Major
Effect?

Null

Null

N

14,339

16,341

2,189

2,657

Notes. Linear regressions with circuit and nature-of-suit dummies. Standard
errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses.
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TABLE 6: IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON DISMISSAL RATE, AO DATA
PANEL A. TWOMBLY
Model
Twombly
Major
Effect?

(1)
All Cases

(2)
All Cases

(3)
Empl.
Discr.

(4)
Empl.
Discr.

–.0024
(.0023)

–.0025
(.0028)

–.0017
(.0067)

.0002
(.0047)

No

No

No

No

Pro se

.0363**
(.0041)

.0188**
(.0039)

Twombly ×
Pro se

–.0014
(.0045)

.0021
(.0056)

No

No

Major
Effect?
N

14,060

16,113

1,575

2,446

PANEL B. IQBAL

Model
Iqbal
Major
Effect?

(1)
All Cases

(2)
All Cases

(3)
Empl.
Discr.

(4)
Empl.
Discr.

–.0000
(.0023)

.0002
(.0028)

.0050
(.0029)

.0076
(.0044)

No

No

No

No

Pro se

.0361**
(.0041)

.0246**
(.0054)

Iqbal ×
Pro se

.0016
(.0038)

–.0092
(.0061)

Major
Effect?

No

No

N

14,339

16,341

1,941

2,657

Notes. Logistic regressions with circuit and nature-of-suit dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects reported. OLS results (unreported) are very similar.
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TABLE 8. HYPOTHESIS 1: PRIOR STUDIES
PANEL A. ALL CASES
H

Outcome

1(a)

MTD Grant Rate
(with prejudice)

Major
Effect?

Hannon (2008)

Null

Hatamyar Moore
(2012)

Null

Hatamyar (2010)

Null

Seiner (2009)

Null

Seiner (2010)

Null

Brescia (2012)

Null

Cecil et al. (2011a,b)

Null

Hubbard (2013)

Null

Reinert (2015)

Null

Dismissal Rate,
All Filed Cases

Hubbard (2013)

No

Gelbach (2012)

Yes

Dismissal Rate
(State Court)

Michalski & Wood
(2015)

Null

Hatamyar Moore
(2012)

Yes

Hatamyar (2010)

Yes

Cecil et al. (2011a,b)

Yes

Dodson (2012)

Yes

Reinert (2015)

Yes

Clermont &
Eisenberg (2014)

Yes

Reinert (2015)

Null

Gelbach (2016)

Null

Reinert (2015)

Null

1(b)
MTD Grant
Rate (without
prejudice)

1(d)

Study

Overall Plaintiff
Win Rate
Summary
Judgment
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TABLE 8. HYPOTHESIS 1: PRIOR STUDIES
PANEL B. PRO SE PLAINTIFFS
H

Outcome

1(a)

MTD Grant Rate
(with prejudice)

1(b)

1(d)

Study

Major
Effect?

Hatamyar Moore
(2012)

Yes

Brescia (2012)

Null

MTD Grant
Rate (without
prejudice)

Dodson (2012)

Yes

Reinert (2015)

Yes

Overall Plaintiff
Win Rate

Clermont &
Eisenberg (2014)

Yes
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TABLE 9. H1(A): CHANGES IN DISMISSAL RATE IN ALL CASES, AO DATA
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

(3)
Linear

(4)
Logistic

–.0027
(.0023)

–.0024
(.0020)

–.0036
(.0023)

–.0033
(.0018)

No

No

No

No

–.0015
(.0018)

–.0014
(.0016)

–.0020
(.0017)

–.0018
(.0017)

No

No

No

No

Pro se

.0760**
(.0079)

.0327**
(.0024)

Twombly ×
Pro se

.0083
(.0060)

.0039**
(.0015)

Major Effect?

Null

No

Iqbal × Pro se

.0170
(.0098)

.0046*
(.0023)

Major Effect?

Null

No

304,937

304,937

Model
Twombly
Major Effect?
Iqbal
Major Effect?

N

265,140

265,140

Notes. Columns (1) and (2) exclude pro se cases. Columns (3) and (4) include
pro se cases. All errors clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, circuit,
and season dummies, and linear time trend included. One and two asterisks
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
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TABLE 10. H1(A): CHANGES IN DISMISSAL RATE IN EMPLOYMENT CASES,
AO DATA
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

(3)
Linear

(4)
Logistic

.0000
(.0023)

.0000
(.0021)

–.0005
(.0027)

–.0011
(.0022)

No

No

No

No

.0013
(.0022)

.0011
(.0021)

.0007
(.0026)

–.0001
(.0028)

No

No

No

No

Pro se

.0513**
(.0062)

.0217**
(.0021)

Twombly ×
Pro se

–.0000
(.0070)

.0015
(.0021)

Major Effect?

No

No

Iqbal × Pro se

.0107
(.0105)

.0034
(.0030)

Major Effect?

Null

No

50,198

50,198

Model
Twombly
Major Effect?
Iqbal
Major Effect?

N

41,115

41,115

Notes. Columns (1) and (2) exclude pro se cases. Columns (3) and (4) include
pro se cases. All errors clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, circuit,
and season dummies, and linear time trend included. One and two asterisks
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
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TABLE 11. H1: DISMISSAL RATES, PACER DATA
PANEL A. H1(A): DISMISSALS WITH PREJUDICE
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

(3)
Linear

(4)
Logistic

Twombly

.008
(.011)

.010
(.015)

.010
(.007)

.009
(.005)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Null

Null

Iqbal

.028
(.019)

.028
(.022)

.001
(.001)

.002
(.007)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Null

Null

N

1,074

1,074

1,074

1,074

Model

PANEL B. H1(B): DISMISSALS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Model

(1)
Linear

Twombly

.008
(.022)

Major Effect?

Null

Iqbal

.000
(.010)

Major Effect?

Null

N

1,074

Notes. Standard errors clustered on coder. Linear regressions include fixed
effects for district. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 11 (CONT.). H1: DISMISSAL RATES, PACER DATA
PANEL C. H1(C): FILINGS OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS
(1)
Linear

Model
Twombly

–.022
(.012)

Major Effect?

Null
.129**
(.002)

Iqbal
Major Effect?

Yes

N

1,074

PANEL D. H1(D): SUMMARY JUDGMENT OUTCOMES
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

Twombly

.009
(.021)

.008
(.015)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Iqbal

–.033
(.034)

–.039
(.022)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

N

1,074

1,074

Model

Notes. Standard errors clustered on coder. Linear regressions include fixed
effects for district. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 12. HYPOTHESES 2–5: PRIOR STUDIES
H
2

3(a)

Outcome

Study

Major
Effect?

Settlement Rate,
All Filed Cases

Pereya &
Sunshine (2015)

Null

Complaint Detail

Hazelton (2015)
(civil rights cases)

Null

Hazelton (2015)
(tort cases)

Yes

3(b)

Amended
Pleadings

---

---

4(a)

Filing Rate

---

---

4(b)

Removal Rate

Curry & Ward
(2013)

Primary Behavior

---

5

Null
---
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TABLE 13. H2: CHANGE IN EARLY SETTLEMENT RATES AFTER
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL, AO DATA
Model
Twombly
Major
Effect?
Iqbal
Major
Effect?

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.0069
(.0063)

.0052
(.0059)

–.0078
(.0085)

–.0021
(.0082)

No

No

No

No

–.0077
(.0083)

–.0067
(.0078)

–.0067
(.0094)

.0004
(.0090)

No

No

No

No

Pro se
Twombly ×
Pro se
Major
Effect?
Iqbal × Pro se
Major
Effect?
Scope
N

–.0843
(.0092)

–.0416

–.0197**
(.0064)

–.0128
(.0086)

No

No

.0030
(.0078)

–.0019
(.0119)

No

Null

All

All

Empl.
Disc.

Empl.
Disc.

212,914

248,585

33,592

42,083

Notes. Linear regressions with errors clustered at the district level. One and
two asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions have circuit, season, and nature-of-suit dummies
and linear time trend.
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TABLE 14. H2: EARLY SETTLEMENT
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

Twombly

–.034
(.004)

–.038**
(.001)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Iqbal

.014
(.017)

.013
(.011)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

N

1,074

1,074

Model

Notes. N = 1074 for most regressions. Standard errors clustered on coder.
Linear regressions include fixed effects for district. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions.
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TABLE 15. H3: PLEADING PRACTICE
PANEL A. H3(A): PLEADING LENGTH AND DETAIL
(1)
Word
Count

(2)
Factual
Paras.

(3)
No. of Legal
Claims

(4)
Detail
Score

Twombly

–52.5
(123)

–1.71
(.798)

–.320
(.204)

.011
(.053)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Null

Null

Iqbal

256
(142)

.259
(1.62)

–.006
(.341)

.113
(.100)

Major Effect?

Null

Null

Null

Null

N

1,074

1,074

1,074

1,074

Model

PANEL B. H3(B): COMPLAINT AMENDMENT
(1)
Linear

(2)
Logistic

(3)
Linear

Twombly

.124
(.032)

.137**
(.033)

.160*
(.006)

Major Effect?

Null

Yes

Yes

Iqbal

.080
(.015)

.095**
(.010)

.014
(.017)

Major Effect?

Null

Yes

Null

N

1,074

1,074

1,074

Model

Notes. N = 1074, except N = 1826 for Word Count regression. Linear regressions with fixed effects for district. Standard errors clustered on coder. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions.
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TABLE 16. H4(A): CHANGES IN ORIGINAL FILING RATE, AO DATA
PANEL A. TWOMBLY
(1)
Linear Trend

(2)
Quadratic Trend

(3)
Cubic Trend

–.0085
(.0229)

.0192
(.0317)

.0192
(.0317)

Major
Effect?

Null

Null

Null

N

3,204

3,204

3,204

Model
Twombly

PANEL B. IQBAL
(1)
Linear Trend

(2)
Quadratic Trend

(3)
Cubic Trend

.0182
(.0190)

–.0020
(.0196)

–.0420
(.0287)

Major
Effect?

Null

Null

Null

N

3,204

3,204

3,204

Model
Iqbal

Notes. Filings are measured in natural logs. Linear regressions with errors
clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, district, and month-of-year
dummies included. One and two asterisks denote statistical significance at
the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Districts with 0 filings in any given month are dropped. Twombly sample
frame is June 2005–May 2008. Iqbal sample frame is October 2007–
September 2010.
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TABLE 17. H4(B): CHANGES IN REMOVAL RATE, AO DATA
PANEL A. TWOMBLY
(1)

(2)

(3)

Linear Trend

Quadratic Trend

Cubic Trend

–.0042
(.0379)

–.0242
(.0464)

–.0242
(.0464)

Major
Effect?

Null

Null

Null

N

2,484

2,484

2,484

Model
Twombly

PANEL B. IQBAL

Model
Iqbal
Major
Effect?
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

Linear Trend

Quadratic Trend

Cubic Trend

.0887*
(.0413)

.0878
(.0391)

–.0269
(.0494)

Yes

Null

Null

2,484

2,484

2,484

Notes. Filings are measured in natural logs. All errors clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, district, and month-of-year dummies included. One
and two asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Districts with 0 filings
in any given month are dropped. Twombly sample frame is June 2005–May
2008. Iqbal sample frame is October 2007–September 2010.
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TABLE 18. SYNOPSIS OF OLD AND NEW FINDINGS
Prior
Studies

Process of
Elimination

Causal
ID

Mixed

No

No

H1(b) Dismissals Without
Prejudice

Yes

Null

---

H1(c) MTD Filing Rate

Yes

Yes

H1(d) Summary Judgment Outcomes

Null

Null

---

H2 Settlements

Null

Mixed

---

H3(a) Complaint
Detail

Null

Mixed

---

H3(b) Amended Complaints

---

Yes

---

H4(a) Original Case Filings

---

Null

---

Null

Mixed

---

---

---

---

Significant Effect on . . .
H1(a) Dismissals

H4(b) Removals
H5 Primary Behavior

Notes. “Yes” indicates an estimate statistically significantly different from
zero and consistent with an effect on 2 percent or more of cases. “No” indicates statistically significant rejection of null of 2 percent effect. “Null” indicates statistically insignificant estimates. “Mixed” indicates a mix of “Yes,”
“No,” and/or “Null.”

